Single transferable votes with tax-cuts

dc.contributor.author	Stensholt, Eivind
dc.date.accessioned	2006-07-14T09:54:54Z
dc.date.available	2006-07-14T09:54:54Z
dc.date.issued	2000
dc.identifier.issn	1500-4066
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/11250/163845
dc.description.abstract	Some tally methods for preferential elections are discussed from the following point of view: how well do they respect a wish from the voter that subsidiary votes in the ballot cannot hurt the chances of the ballot’s top-ranked candidate? The tally method of Single Transferable Votes, STV, is constructed to obey this principle without exception, but other defects show up, in particular non-monotonicity, premature eliminations, and free rides. Various modifications of the STV are suggested to reduce the election method’s weaknesses without losing too much of its strengths.	en
dc.format.extent	177427 bytes
dc.format.mimetype	application/pdf
dc.language.iso	eng	en
dc.publisher	Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. Department of Finance and Management Science	en
dc.relation.ispartofseries	Discussion Paper	en
dc.relation.ispartofseries	2000:16	en
dc.subject	election systems	en
dc.subject	single transferable votes	en
dc.subject	monotonicity	en
dc.title	Single transferable votes with tax-cuts	en
dc.type	Working paper