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dc.contributor.authorAase, Knut K.
dc.date.accessioned2007-06-21T12:59:54Z
dc.date.available2007-06-21T12:59:54Z
dc.date.issued2006
dc.identifier.issn1500-4066
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/163855
dc.description.abstractRisk-sharing in insurance is analyzed, with a view towards explaining the prevalence of deductibles. First we introduce, in a modern setting, the main concepts of the theory of risk-sharing in a group of agents. This theory we apply to the risk-sharing problem between an insurer and an insurance customer. We motivate the development through simple examples, illustrating some of the subtle points of this theory. In order to deduce deductibles endogenously, not explained in the neoclassical model, we separately introduce (i) the insurable asset as a decision variable, (ii) administrative costs, and (iii) moral hazard, and illustrate by examples.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisherNorwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. Department of Finance and Management Scienceen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion paperen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2006:24en
dc.subjectreinsurance exchangeen
dc.subjectequilibriumen
dc.subjectpareto optimalityen
dc.subjectrepresentative agenten
dc.subjectcore solutionen
dc.subjectindividual rationalityen
dc.subjectdeductiblesen
dc.subjectcostsen
dc.subjectmoral hazarden
dc.titleOptimal Risk-Sharing and Deductables in Insuranceen
dc.typeWorking paperen
dc.subject.nsiVDP::Samfunnsvitenskap: 200::Økonomi: 210en


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