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dc.contributor.authorHvide, Hans K.
dc.contributor.authorKristiansen, Eirik Gaard
dc.date.accessioned2007-06-21T11:57:02Z
dc.date.available2007-06-21T11:57:02Z
dc.date.issued2006-06
dc.identifier.issn1500-4066
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/163863
dc.description.abstractWe study how complementarities and intellectual property rights affect the management of knowledge workers. The main results relay when a firm will wish to sue workers that leave with innovative ideas, and the effects of complementary assets on wages and on worker initiative. We argue that firms strongly protected by property rights may not sue leaving workers in order to motivate effort, while firms weakly protected by complementary assets must sue in order to obtain positive profits. Firms with more complementary assets pay higher wages (and have lower turnover), but such higher pay has a detrimental effect on worker initiative. Our analysis suggests that strengthened property rights protection reduces turnover costs but weakens worker initiative.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisherNorwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. Department of Finance and Management Scienceen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion paperen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2006:7en
dc.subjectentrepreneurshipen
dc.subjectinnovationen
dc.subjectIPPen
dc.subjectlitigationen
dc.subjectpersonnel economicsen
dc.subjectR&Den
dc.subjectstart-upsen
dc.titleManagement of Knowledge Workersen
dc.typeWorking paperen
dc.subject.nsiVDP::Samfunnsvitenskap: 200::Økonomi: 210::Bedriftsøkonomi: 213en


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