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dc.contributor.authorKvaløy, Ola
dc.contributor.authorOlsen, Trond E.
dc.date.accessioned2007-06-21T12:58:37Z
dc.date.available2007-06-21T12:58:37Z
dc.date.issued2006-07
dc.identifier.issn1500-4066
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/163877
dc.description.abstractWhy does individual performance pay seem to prevail in human-capital-intensive industries where teamwork is so common? We present a model that aims to explain this. In a repeated game model of relational contracting, we analyze the conditions for implementing peerdependent incentive regimes when agents possess indispensable human capital. We show that the larger the share of values that the agents can hold-up, the lower is the implementable degree of peer-dependent incentives. In a setting with team effects - complementary tasks and peer pressure, respectively - we show that while group-based incentives are optimal if agents are dispensable, it may be costly, and in fact suboptimal, to provide team incentives once the agents become indispensable.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisherNorwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. Department of Finance and Management Scienceen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion paperen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2006:22en
dc.subjectrelational contractsen
dc.subjectmultiagent moral hazarden
dc.subjectindispensable human capitalen
dc.titleThe rise of individual performance payen
dc.typeWorking paperen
dc.subject.nsiVDP::Samfunnsvitenskap: 200::Økonomi: 210::Bedriftsøkonomi: 213en


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