dc.contributor.author | Kind, Hans Jarle | |
dc.contributor.author | Koethenbuerger, Marko | |
dc.contributor.author | Schjelderup, Guttorm | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2007-06-20T10:36:57Z | |
dc.date.available | 2007-06-20T10:36:57Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2007-01 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 1500-4066 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11250/163899 | |
dc.description.abstract | Two-sided platform firms serve distinct customer groups that are connected through interdependent demand, and include major businesses such as the media industry, banking, and the software industry. A well known textbook result in one-sided markets is that a government may increase a monopolist’s output and reduce the deadweight loss by subsidizing output. The present paper shows that this result need not hold in a two-sided market. On the contrary, a higher advalorem tax rate - rather than a subsidy - could increase output and enhance welfare. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. Department of Finance and Management Science | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | Discussion paper | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | 2007:3 | en |
dc.subject | two-sided markets | en |
dc.subject | ad-valorem taxes | en |
dc.subject | specific taxes | en |
dc.subject | imperfect competition | en |
dc.subject | industrial organization | en |
dc.title | Taxation in Two-Sided Markets | en |
dc.type | Working paper | en |
dc.subject.nsi | VDP::Samfunnsvitenskap: 200::Økonomi: 210::Bedriftsøkonomi: 213 | en |