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dc.contributor.authorKind, Hans Jarle
dc.contributor.authorKoethenbuerger, Marko
dc.contributor.authorSchjelderup, Guttorm
dc.date.accessioned2007-06-20T10:36:57Z
dc.date.available2007-06-20T10:36:57Z
dc.date.issued2007-01
dc.identifier.issn1500-4066
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/163899
dc.description.abstractTwo-sided platform firms serve distinct customer groups that are connected through interdependent demand, and include major businesses such as the media industry, banking, and the software industry. A well known textbook result in one-sided markets is that a government may increase a monopolist’s output and reduce the deadweight loss by subsidizing output. The present paper shows that this result need not hold in a two-sided market. On the contrary, a higher advalorem tax rate - rather than a subsidy - could increase output and enhance welfare.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisherNorwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. Department of Finance and Management Scienceen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion paperen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2007:3en
dc.subjecttwo-sided marketsen
dc.subjectad-valorem taxesen
dc.subjectspecific taxesen
dc.subjectimperfect competitionen
dc.subjectindustrial organizationen
dc.titleTaxation in Two-Sided Marketsen
dc.typeWorking paperen
dc.subject.nsiVDP::Samfunnsvitenskap: 200::Økonomi: 210::Bedriftsøkonomi: 213en


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