Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorJaneba, Eckhard
dc.contributor.authorSchjelderup, Guttorm
dc.date.accessioned2008-10-23T13:03:02Z
dc.date.available2008-10-23T13:03:02Z
dc.date.issued2008-10
dc.identifier.issn1500-4066
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/163953
dc.description.abstractThe views on the welfare effects of tax competition differ widely. Some see the fiscal externalities as the cause for underprovision of public goods, while others see tax competition as means to reduce government inefficiencies. Using a comparative politics approach we show that tax competition among presidential-congressional democracies is typically welfare improving, while harmful among parliamentary democracies if under the latter the marginal benefit of the public good is sufficiently high. The results hold when politicians seek re-election because of exogenous benefits of holding office. By contrast, when politicians hold office only to extract rents, tax competition is harmful if politicians are sufficiently patient.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisherNorwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. Department of Finance and Management Scienceen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion paperen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2008:22en
dc.titleThe welfare effects of tax competition reconsidered : politicians and political institutionsen
dc.typeWorking paperen
dc.subject.nsiVDP::Samfunnsvitenskap: 200::Økonomi: 210::Samfunnsøkonomi: 212en


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record