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dc.contributor.authorClark, Derek J.
dc.contributor.authorForos, Øystein
dc.contributor.authorSand, Jan Yngve
dc.date.accessioned2009-05-04T10:35:15Z
dc.date.available2009-05-04T10:35:15Z
dc.date.issued2008-12
dc.identifier.issn1500-4066
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/163957
dc.description.abstractWe consider a contest in which one firm is a favourite as it initially has a cost advantage over rivals. Instead of taking the set of rivals as given, we consider the possibility that the favourite transfers the source of its advantage wholly or partially to a subset of rival firms. The result of this may be foreclosure of those firms that do not receive the cost reduction. We present conditions under which this transfer will be expected to occur, and show that the dominant firm will prefer to grant some rivals the maximum cost reduction even if a partial transfer can be made. Furthermore we consider the welfare properties of excluding some rivals. Applications include lobbying, patent races and access to essential infrastructure.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisherNorwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. Department of Finance and Management Scienceen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion paperen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2008:27en
dc.subjectForeclosureen
dc.subjectcontesten
dc.titleForeclosure in contestsen
dc.typeWorking paperen
dc.subject.nsiVDP::Samfunnsvitenskap: 200::Økonomi: 210::Bedriftsøkonomi: 213en


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