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dc.contributor.authorForos, Øystein
dc.contributor.authorKind, Hans Jarle
dc.contributor.authorShaffer, Greg
dc.date.accessioned2011-03-14T09:19:32Z
dc.date.available2011-03-14T09:19:32Z
dc.date.issued2010-12
dc.identifier.issn1500-4066
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/164001
dc.description.abstractIn this paper we compare the profitability of a merger between two firms (one firm fully acquires another) and the profitability of a partial ownership arrangement between the same two firms in which the acquiring firm obtains corporate control over the pricing decisions of the acquired firm. We find that joint profit can be higher in the latter case because it may result in a greater dampening of competition with respect to an outside competitor. We also derive comparative statics on the prices of the acquiring firm, the acquired firm, and the outside firm and use them to explain puzzling features of the pay-TV markets in Norway and Sweden.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisherNorwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. Department of Finance and Management Scienceen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion paperen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2010:15en
dc.subjectmedia economicsen
dc.subjectmergersen
dc.subjectcorporate controlen
dc.subjectfinancial controlen
dc.titleMergers and partial ownershipen
dc.typeWorking paperen
dc.subject.nsiVDP::Samfunnsvitenskap: 200::Økonomi: 210::Bedriftsøkonomi: 213en


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