A behavioral explanation of the relative performance evaluation puzzle

dc.contributor.author	Fershtman, Chaim
dc.contributor.author	Hvide, Hans K.
dc.contributor.author	Weiss, Yoram
dc.date.accessioned	2006-07-13T11:45:36Z
dc.date.available	2006-07-13T11:45:36Z
dc.date.issued	2002-11
dc.identifier.issn	1500-4066
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/11250/164045
dc.description.abstract	We study the effects of competitive preferences, where Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) compare their wage to the wage of other CEOs within the same industry, and derive additional utility from being ahead of them. We show that such concerns work in the direction of CEO wages being positively correlated, in contrast to the Relative Performance Evaluation hypothesis, but consistent with several empirical studies.	en
dc.format.extent	148973 bytes
dc.format.mimetype	application/pdf
dc.language.iso	eng	en
dc.publisher	Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. Department of Finance and Management Science	en
dc.relation.ispartofseries	Discussion paper	en
dc.relation.ispartofseries	2002:11	en
dc.title	A behavioral explanation of the relative performance evaluation puzzle	en
dc.type	Working paper	en