Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorEriksen, Kristoffer W.
dc.contributor.authorKvaløy, Ola
dc.contributor.authorOlsen, Trond E.
dc.date.accessioned2008-10-23T13:10:17Z
dc.date.available2008-10-23T13:10:17Z
dc.date.issued2008-10
dc.identifier.issn1500-4066
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/164121
dc.description.abstractIn many tournaments it is the contestants themselves who determine reward allocation. Labor-union members bargain over wage distribution, and many firms allow self-managed teams to freely determine internal resource allocation, incentive structure, and division of labour. We analyze, and test experimentally, a rank-order tournament where heterogenous agents determine the spread between winner prize and looser prize. We investigate the relationship between prize spread, uncertainty (i.e. noise between effort and performance), heterogeneity and effort. The paper challenges well-known results from tournament theory. We find that a large prize spread is associated with low degree of uncertainty and high degree of heterogeneity, and that heterogeneity triggers effort. By and large, our real-effort experiment supports the theoretical predictions.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisherNorwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. Department of Finance and Management Scienceen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion paperen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2008:23en
dc.titleTournaments with prize-setting agentsen
dc.typeWorking paperen
dc.subject.nsiVDP::Samfunnsvitenskap: 200::Økonomi: 210::Samfunnsøkonomi: 212en


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record