• Consumer heterogeneity and pricing in a duopoly with switching costs 

      Gabrielsen, Tommy Staahl; Vagstad, Steinar (Working paper, Working paper, 2000-05)
      It is well-known that switching costs may facilitate monopoly pricing in a market with price competition between two suppliers of a homogenous good, provided the switching costs is above some critical level. We show that ...
    • Contracting versus bypassing 

      Gabrielsen, Tommy Staahl; Sørgard, Lars (Working paper, Working paper, 2003-11)
      One existing distributor controls the existing access to end users. There are one incumbent producer and one potential entrant, both with a potential for bypassing the distributor. We find that the distributor always signs ...
    • Customer poaching with differentiated products and switching costs 

      Gabrielsen, Tommy Staahl (Working paper, Working paper, 2003-06)
      We consider a dynamic two-period model where two firms offer products that are differentiated a la Hotelling. Consumers purchase products in a first period, and in a second period consumers are locked-in to their first-period ...
    • Delegated bargaining and competition 

      Gabrielsen, Tommy Staahl; Roth, Stefan (Working Paper, Working paper, 2004-08)
      In this paper, we analyze a two-producers two-agent model in which producers delegate sales and price negotiations to exclusive, separate, and independent agents. Producers first choose a pricing arrangement (two-part ...
    • Inequality, product durability and the adoption of new technology products 

      Gabrielsen, Tommy Staahl (Working Paper, Working paper, 2001-12)
      The analysis highlights how inequality and the cost of producing durability influence the degree to which new technology products are adopted in an economy. It is shown that redistribution may both increase and lower ...
    • On how size and composition of customer bases affect equilibrium in a duopoly with switching costs 

      Gabrielsen, Tommy Staahl; Vagstad, Steinar (Working Paper, Working paper, 2001-10)
      Switching costs may facilitate monopoly pricing in a market with price competition between two suppliers of a homogenous good, provided the switchi8ng cost is above some critical level. It is also well known that asymmetric ...
    • On the costs and benefits of vertical integration 

      Gabrielsen, Tommy Staahl (Working paper, Working paper, 2003-06)
      We consider a setting where two upstream firms may vertically integrate or contract with a single downstream distributor. Under vertical integration the integrated firm may offer to share the downstream capacity with its ...
    • Private label entry as a competitive force? : an analysis of price responses in the Norwegian food sector 

      Gabrielsen, Tommy Staahl; Steen, Frode; Sørgard, Lars (Working Paper, Working paper, 2001-12)
      According to existing theory, the introduction of a private label has an ambiguous effect on the prices of competing national brands. We undertake an empirical analysis of the effects of private label entry on national ...
    • Private labels, price rivalry, and public policy 

      Gabrielsen, Tommy Staahl; Sørgard, Lars (Working paper, Working paper, 2000-08)
      The article examines how the existence of a retailer owned brand, private label, affects the price setting of a national brand. We find that potential for a private label introduction may lead to price concessions from the ...
    • Second-period pricing in a duopoly with switching costs : the effect of size and composition of customer bases 

      Gabrielsen, Tommy Staahl; Vagstad, Steinar (Working Paper, Working paper, 2001-04)
      Switching costs may facilitate monopoly pricing in a market with price competition between two suppliers of a homogenous good, provided the switching cost is above some critical level. It is also well known that asymmetric ...
    • Slotting allowances and buy-back clauses 

      Gabrielsen, Tommy Staahl (Working paper, Working paper, 2005-02)
      In this paper we investigate some of the most frequent arguments for the use of slotting allowances. It has been claimed that slotting allowances can be profitability used to increase retail profits at the cost of increasing ...
    • The opportunism problem revisited : the case of retailer sales effort 

      Gabrielsen, Tommy Staahl; Johansen, Bjørn Olav (Working paper;30/13, Working paper, 2013-09)
      We study a setting where the opportunism or commitment problem identified by Hart and Tirole (1990) may arise. An upstream monopolist may sell its product to two differentiated downstream retailers. Contract unobservability ...
    • Tosidige markeder, nettverkseffekter og offentlig politikk 

      Gabrielsen, Tommy Staahl (Arbeidsnotat, Working paper, 2005-10)
      De siste årene har det vokst fram en interessant litteratur om såkalte tosidige markeder. Et eksempel på en bedrift som opererer i et tosidig marked er en dagsavis. Avisen vil typisk finansiere sin virksomhet både gjennom ...
    • Trade liberalization and distribution 

      Gabrielsen, Tommy Staahl (Working Paper, Working paper, 2001-10)
      We analyze how the organization of imports of agricultural products due to trade liberalization affects domestic production, profits and welfare. A local wholesaler owned by local farmers (cooperative) competes with an ...
    • Two-sided markets with bargaining over content : the monopoly case 

      Gabrielsen, Tommy Staahl (Working paper, Working paper, 2006-04)
      A TV platform provides content to viewers and viewers to advertising producers. We study platform pricing and the supply of an essential type of content when there are two-sided network effects and the platform bargains ...
    • Why is on-net traffic cheaper than off-net traffic? 

      Gabrielsen, Tommy Staahl; Vagstad, Steinar (Working Paper, Working paper, 2002-04)
      Received literature have shown that if competing Telecom networks are restricted to linear pricing and are unable to discriminate between on- and off-net calls, high access charges can be a device for facilitating collusion. ...