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dc.contributor.authorHannesson, Rögnvaldur
dc.date.accessioned2006-06-27T15:47:07Z
dc.date.available2006-06-27T15:47:07Z
dc.date.issued2004-04
dc.identifier.issn1503-2140
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/165468
dc.description.abstractThis paper discusses the incentive compatibility of fish-sharing agreements based on zonal attachment of fish stocks. It is shown that the minor partner in a fish-sharing agreement may not have an incentive to cooperate unless he gets a larger share of the cooperative profits than his share of the stock according to the zonal attachment. This is particularly likely to happen when the unit cost of fish does not depend on the stock.en
dc.format.extent66081 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisherSNF/Centre for Fisheries Economicsen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking paperen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2004:15en
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion paperen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2004:5en
dc.titleIncentive compatibility of fish-sharing agreementsen
dc.typeWorking paperen


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