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dc.contributor.authorForos, Øystein
dc.contributor.authorKind, Hans Jarle
dc.contributor.authorSand, Jan Yngve
dc.date.accessioned2006-06-27T15:38:13Z
dc.date.available2006-06-27T15:38:13Z
dc.date.issued2004-06
dc.identifier.issn1503-2140
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/165488
dc.description.abstractIn this paper we analyze the interconnection incentives for two networks that differ with respect to size of their installed based. In the first part we prove that the smaller firm may be harmed in competition for new customers if the installed base customers pay a high price. In the second part we assume that the interconnection quality to customers in the installed bases is set before the interconnection quality to new customers. We show that both firms prefer perfect interconnection quality to new customers if the installed base interconnection quality is sufficiently high, and we discuss what policy implications this may have.en
dc.format.extent332704 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisherSNFen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking Paperen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2004:20en
dc.subjectnetwork externalitiesen
dc.subjectcompetitionen
dc.subjectinterconnectionen
dc.titleDo internet incumbents choose low interconnection quality?en
dc.typeWorking paperen


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