Input price discrimination with heterogenous sub-markets

dc.contributor.author	Sand, Jan Yngve
dc.date.accessioned	2006-06-23T12:14:36Z
dc.date.available	2006-06-23T12:14:36Z
dc.date.issued	2004-12
dc.identifier.issn	1503-2140
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/11250/165502
dc.description.abstract	The objective of the paper is to analyse optimal prices for an input monopolist in the presence of asymmetric information about the size of the sub-markets, and when the sub-markets may provide either substitute or complementary products to the input provider’s own downstream subsidiary. The downstream firms produce products that may be vertically differentiated, but the degree of vertical differentiation is assumed to be private knowledge to the downstream firms.	en
dc.format.extent	254747 bytes
dc.format.mimetype	application/pdf
dc.language.iso	eng	en
dc.publisher	SNF	en
dc.relation.ispartofseries	Working paper	en
dc.relation.ispartofseries	2004:69	en
dc.subject	input price descrimination	en
dc.subject	access charges	en
dc.subject	asymmetric information	en
dc.title	Input price discrimination with heterogenous sub-markets	en
dc.type	Working paper	en