dc.contributor.author | Sand, Jan Yngve | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2006-06-23T11:20:55Z | |
dc.date.available | 2006-06-23T11:20:55Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2005-12 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 1503-2140 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11250/165504 | |
dc.description.abstract | This paper investigates a market with strictly complementary inputs, with a particular emphasis on how efficiency can be implemented when the productive firms undertake unobservable effort. It is shown that simple linear sharing rules cannot implement socially optimal effort, but a modified linear sharing rule can implement the first-best outcome and a restricted linear sharing rule can be used to implement the second-best outcome. In addition, problems associated with commitment to the sharing rule is discussed. | en |
dc.format.extent | 382264 bytes | |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | SNF | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | Working Paper | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | 2005:73 | en |
dc.subject | complements | en |
dc.subject | intermediary | en |
dc.subject | commitment | en |
dc.title | Efficiency in complementary partnerships with competition | en |
dc.type | Working paper | en |