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dc.contributor.authorKvaløy, Ola
dc.date.accessioned2006-06-28T07:14:28Z
dc.date.available2006-06-28T07:14:28Z
dc.date.issued2003-11
dc.identifier.issn1503-2140
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/165632
dc.description.abstractAsset specificity is usually considered to be an argument for vertical integration.The main idea is that specificity induces opportunistic behaviour, and that vertical integration reduces this problem of opportunism. In this article I show that asset specificity actually can be an argument for non-integration. In a repeated game model of relational contracts, based on Baker, Gibbons and Murphy, 2002, I show that asset specificity affects the temptation to renege on relational contracts between non-integrated parties, but not between integrated parties. If the parties are non-integrated higher levels of specificity can provide relational contracts with higher-powered incentives.en
dc.format.extent124389 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisherSNFen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking paperen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2003:51en
dc.titleAsset specificity and vertical integrationen
dc.typeWorking paperen


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