Vis enkel innførsel

dc.contributor.authorVagstad, Steinar
dc.date.accessioned2006-06-29T07:52:24Z
dc.date.available2006-06-29T07:52:24Z
dc.date.issued2004-01
dc.identifier.issn1503-2140
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/165672
dc.description.abstractConsider an auction in which potential bidders must sink an entry investment before learning their values, but where the auction designer can release information so that the bidders learn their values before entry. Such early information will induce screening of high-value bidders, and it will give rise to information rents and thereby a difference between the socially optimal auction and the auctioneer's preferred mechanism. Therefor, the auction designer has too weak incentives to produce early information. Early information may increase or reduce equilibrium entry. If entry is sufficiently reduced, early information will harm the auction designer.en
dc.format.extent315584 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisherSNFen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking Paperen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2004:2en
dc.subjectauctionsen
dc.subjectentryen
dc.subjectinvestmenten
dc.subjectinformation renten
dc.titleEarly information in auctions with entryen
dc.typeWorking paperen


Tilhørende fil(er)

Thumbnail

Denne innførselen finnes i følgende samling(er)

Vis enkel innførsel