Consumer heterogeneity and pricing in a duopoly with switching costs

dc.contributor.author	Gabrielsen, Tommy Staahl
dc.contributor.author	Vagstad, Steinar
dc.date.accessioned	2006-08-29T08:14:22Z
dc.date.available	2006-08-29T08:14:22Z
dc.date.issued	2000-05
dc.identifier.issn	0803-4028
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/11250/165920
dc.description.abstract	It is well-known that switching costs may facilitate monopoly pricing in a market with price competition between two suppliers of a homogenous good, provided the switching costs is above some critical level. We show that introducing consumer heterogeneity tends to increase the critical switching cost and thereby reduce the stability of the collusive outcome. A testable implication is that widespread price discrimination should go hand in hand with efforts to create switching costs.	en
dc.format.extent	848877 bytes
dc.format.mimetype	application/pdf
dc.language.iso	eng	en
dc.publisher	SNF	en
dc.relation.ispartofseries	Working paper	en
dc.relation.ispartofseries	2000:25	en
dc.title	Consumer heterogeneity and pricing in a duopoly with switching costs	en
dc.type	Working paper	en