Should auctioneers supply early information for prospective bidders?

dc.contributor.author	Vagstad, Steinar
dc.date.accessioned	2006-09-07T08:39:32Z
dc.date.available	2006-09-07T08:39:32Z
dc.date.issued	2001-06
dc.identifier.issn	0803-4028
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/11250/165962
dc.description.abstract	Consider an auction in wich potential bidders must sink an entry investment before learning their values (Levin and Smith, 1994). Suppose the auction designer can make the bidders learn their value before entry (as in Samuelson, 1985). Such early information will induce screening of high-value bidders, and it will give rise to information rents and thereby a difference between the socially optimal auction and the auctioneer's preferred mechanism. Therefore, the auction designer has too weak incentives to produce early information. Early information may increase or reduce equilibrium entry. If entry is sufficiently reduced, early information will harm the auction designer.	en
dc.format.extent	1578785 bytes
dc.format.mimetype	application/pdf
dc.language.iso	eng	en
dc.publisher	SNF	en
dc.relation.ispartofseries	Working Paper	en
dc.relation.ispartofseries	2001:21	en
dc.subject	auctions	en
dc.subject	entry	en
dc.subject	investment	en
dc.subject	information rent	en
dc.title	Should auctioneers supply early information for prospective bidders?	en
dc.type	Working paper	en