Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorSchindler, Dirk
dc.contributor.authorSchjelderup, Guttorm
dc.date.accessioned2007-02-20T10:02:26Z
dc.date.available2007-02-20T10:02:26Z
dc.date.issued2006-10
dc.identifier.issn1503-2140
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/166104
dc.description.abstractWe study how harmonization of corporate tax systems affects the stability of international cartels. We show that tax base harmonization reinforces collusive agreements, while harmonization of corporate tax rates may destabilize or stabilize cartels. We also find that bilateral and full harmonization to a common standard is worse from society’s point of view than unilateral harmonization to a minimum tax standard.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisherSNFen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking paperen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2006:41en
dc.subjectcorporate tax systemsen
dc.subjecttacit collusionen
dc.titleHarmonization of corporate tax systems and its effect on collusive behavioren
dc.typeWorking paperen
dc.subject.nsiVDP::Samfunnsvitenskap: 200::Økonomi: 210::Samfunnsøkonomi: 212en


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record