Private information, transfer utility, and the core

dc.contributor.author	Flåm, Sjur Didrik
dc.contributor.author	Koutsougeras, L.
dc.date.accessioned	2008-01-14T12:11:16Z
dc.date.available	2008-01-14T12:11:16Z
dc.date.issued	2007-09
dc.identifier.issn	1503-2140
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/11250/166116
dc.description.abstract	Considered here are transferable-utility, coalitional production or market games,featuring differently informed players. It is assumed that personalized contracts must comply with idiosyncratic information. The setting may create two sorts of shadow prices: one for material endowments, the other for knowledge. Focus is on specific, computable solutions that are generated by such prices and belong to the private core. Solutions of that sort obtain under standard regularity assumptions.	en
dc.language.iso	eng	en
dc.publisher	SNF	en
dc.relation.ispartofseries	Working paper	en
dc.relation.ispartofseries	2007:25	en
dc.subject	exchange economy	en
dc.subject	cooperative game	en
dc.subject	transferable utility	en
dc.subject	differential information	en
dc.subject	private core	en
dc.subject	Lagrangian duality	en
dc.subject	value of information	en
dc.title	Private information, transfer utility, and the core	en
dc.type	Working paper	en
dc.subject.nsi	VDP::Samfunnsvitenskap: 200::Økonomi: 210::Bedriftsøkonomi: 213	en