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dc.contributor.authorKind, Hans Jarle
dc.contributor.authorKoethenbuerger, Marko
dc.contributor.authorSchjelderup, Guttorm
dc.date.accessioned2008-08-28T08:30:30Z
dc.date.available2008-08-28T08:30:30Z
dc.date.issued2008-01
dc.identifier.issn1503-2140
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/166164
dc.description.abstractThis paper examines the efficient provision of goods in two-sided markets and characterizes optimal specific and ad-valorem taxes. We show that (i) a monopoly may have too tight output compared to the social optimum; (ii) output may be reduced by imposing negative value-added taxes (subsidy) or positive specific taxes.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisherSNFen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking paperen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2008:1en
dc.titleEfficiency enhancing taxation in two-sided marketsen
dc.typeWorking paperen
dc.subject.nsiVDP::Samfunnsvitenskap: 200::Økonomi: 210::Samfunnsøkonomi: 212en


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