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dc.contributor.authorForos, Øystein
dc.contributor.authorKind, Hans Jarle
dc.contributor.authorSørgard, Lars
dc.date.accessioned2006-06-21T07:14:22Z
dc.date.available2006-06-21T07:14:22Z
dc.date.issued2005-10
dc.identifier.issn1503-2140
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/166364
dc.description.abstractWe consider the effects of a one-sided price regulation of one of two complementary inputs. The provider of the regulated component is a domestic firm, while the provider of the other component is a foreign firm. This describes the market structure for several digital information and communication services. We show that one-sided regulation may have negative welfare effects compared to a free market economy unless the regulator has a first-mover advantage. In the latter case, regulation is welfare enhancing regardless of whether the foreign input provider uses linear or non-linear wholesale prices.en
dc.format.extent218527 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisherSNFen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking Paperen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2005:64en
dc.subjectcomplementaritiesen
dc.subjectregulationen
dc.subjectstrategic trade policyen
dc.titleWelfare effects of one-sided regulation when internationally traded complements are unregulateden
dc.typeWorking paperen


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