dc.contributor.author | Foros, Øystein | |
dc.contributor.author | Kind, Hans Jarle | |
dc.contributor.author | Sørgard, Lars | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2006-06-21T07:14:22Z | |
dc.date.available | 2006-06-21T07:14:22Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2005-10 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 1503-2140 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11250/166364 | |
dc.description.abstract | We consider the effects of a one-sided price regulation of one of two complementary inputs. The provider of the regulated component is a domestic firm, while the provider of the other component is a foreign firm. This describes the market structure for several digital information and communication services. We show that one-sided regulation may have negative welfare effects compared to a free market economy unless the regulator has a first-mover advantage. In the latter case, regulation is welfare enhancing regardless of whether the foreign input provider uses linear or non-linear wholesale prices. | en |
dc.format.extent | 218527 bytes | |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | SNF | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | Working Paper | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | 2005:64 | en |
dc.subject | complementarities | en |
dc.subject | regulation | en |
dc.subject | strategic trade policy | en |
dc.title | Welfare effects of one-sided regulation when internationally traded complements are unregulated | en |
dc.type | Working paper | en |