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dc.contributor.authorCosnita-Langlais, Andreea
dc.contributor.authorSørgard, Lars
dc.date.accessioned2014-04-29T12:47:01Z
dc.date.available2014-04-29T12:47:01Z
dc.date.issued2014-03
dc.identifier.issn0804-6824
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/194525
dc.description.abstractThis paper deals with the enforcement of merger policy, and aims to study how merger remedies affect the deterrence accomplished by controlling mergers. We determine the optimal frequency of investigations launched by the agency, and identify situations where the introduction of remedies can lead to a lower welfare. We nd that the potential for remedies can make it less likely that the worst mergers are deterred. Even if the worst mergers are deterred, the potential for remedies can lead to more mergers with a negative impact to be proposed, and eventually to more decision errors by the antitrust authorities.nb_NO
dc.language.isoengnb_NO
dc.publisherNorwegian School of Economics. Department of Economicsnb_NO
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion paper;7/2014
dc.subjectVDP::Samfunnsvitenskap: 200::Økonomi: 210::Samfunnsøkonomi: 212nb_NO
dc.subjectmerger controlnb_NO
dc.subjectmerger remediesnb_NO
dc.subjectenforcement, deterrencenb_NO
dc.titleEnforcement vs deterrence in merger control : can remedies lead to lower welfare?nb_NO
dc.typeWorking papernb_NO
dc.subject.jelK21
dc.subject.jelL41


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