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dc.contributor.authorKind, Hans Jarle
dc.contributor.authorNilssen, Tore
dc.contributor.authorSørgard, Lars
dc.date.accessioned2014-05-21T12:14:02Z
dc.date.available2014-05-21T12:14:02Z
dc.date.issued2014-05
dc.identifier.issn0804-6824
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/195307
dc.description.abstractIn many two-sided markets we observe that there is a common distributor on one side of the market. One example is the TV industry, where TV channels choose advertising prices to maximize own profit and typically delegate determination of viewer prices to independent distributors. We show that in such a market structure the stronger the competition between the TV channels, the greater will joint profits in the TV industry be. We also show that joint profits might be higher if the wholesale contract between each TV channel and the distributor consists of a simple fixed fee rather than a two-part tariff.nb_NO
dc.language.isoengnb_NO
dc.publisherNorwegian School of Economics. Department of Economicsnb_NO
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion paper;16/2014
dc.subjectVDP::Samfunnsvitenskap: 200::Økonomi: 210::Samfunnsøkonomi: 212nb_NO
dc.subjectVertical relationsnb_NO
dc.subjectadvertisingnb_NO
dc.subjectmedia economicsnb_NO
dc.titleInter-firm price coordination in a two-sided marketnb_NO
dc.typeWorking papernb_NO
dc.subject.jelL11
dc.subject.jelL82
dc.subject.jelM31
dc.subject.jelM37


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