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dc.contributor.authorBrekke, Kurt Richard
dc.contributor.authorSiciliani, Luigi
dc.contributor.authorStraume, Odd Rune
dc.date.accessioned2014-06-11T07:08:41Z
dc.date.available2014-06-11T07:08:41Z
dc.date.issued2014-05
dc.identifier.issn0804-6824
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/196298
dc.description.abstractWe study the effects of a hospital merger using a spatial competition framework with semialtruistic hospitals that invest in quality and expend cost-containment effort facing regulated prices. We find that the merging hospitals always reduce quality, whereas non-merging hospitals respond by increasing (reducing) quality if qualities are strategic substitutes (complements). A merger leads to higher average treatment cost efficiency and, if qualities are strategic substitutes, might also increase average quality in the market. If a merger leads to hospital closure, the resulting effect on quality is positive (negative) for all hospitals in the market if qualities are strategic substitutes (complements). Whether qualities are strategic substitutes or complements depends on the degree of altruism, the effectiveness of cost-containment effort, and the degree of cost substitutability between quality and treatment volume.nb_NO
dc.language.isoengnb_NO
dc.publisherNorwegian School of Economics. Department of Economicsnb_NO
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion paper;21/2014
dc.subjectVDP::Samfunnsvitenskap: 200::Økonomi: 210::Samfunnsøkonomi: 212nb_NO
dc.subjecthospital mergersnb_NO
dc.subjectquality competitionnb_NO
dc.subjectcost efficiencynb_NO
dc.subjectantitrustnb_NO
dc.titleHospital mergers with regulated pricesnb_NO
dc.typeWorking papernb_NO
dc.subject.jelI11
dc.subject.jelI18
dc.subject.jelL13
dc.subject.jelL44


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