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dc.contributor.authorJensen, Sissel
dc.contributor.authorKvaløy, Ola
dc.contributor.authorOlsen, Trond E.
dc.contributor.authorSørgard, Lars
dc.date.accessioned2014-12-15T10:34:18Z
dc.date.available2014-12-15T10:34:18Z
dc.date.issued2013-05
dc.identifier.issn1500-4066
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/227221
dc.description.abstractThe economics of crime and punishment postulates that higher punishment leads to lower crime levels, or less severe crime. It is how- ever hard to get empirical support for this rather intuitive relationship. This paper offers a model that can contribute to explain why this is the case. We show that if criminals can spend resources to reduce the probability of being detected, then a higher general punishment level can increase the crime level. In the context of antitrust enforcement, the model shows that competition authorities who attempt to fight cartels by means of tougher sanctions for all o¤enders may actually lead cartels to increase their overcharge when leniency programs are in place.nb_NO
dc.language.isoengnb_NO
dc.publisherFORnb_NO
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion paper;05/13
dc.subjectantitrust enforcementnb_NO
dc.subjectleniency programsnb_NO
dc.subjecteconomics of crimenb_NO
dc.titleCrime and punishment: When tougher antitrust enforcement leads to higher overchargenb_NO
dc.typeWorking papernb_NO


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