Teams in Relational Contracts

dc.contributor.author	Kvaløy, Ola
dc.contributor.author	Olsen, Trond E.
dc.date.accessioned	2016-12-16T11:24:06Z
dc.date.available	2016-12-16T11:24:06Z
dc.date.issued	2016-12-16
dc.identifier.issn	1500-4066
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/11250/2425349
dc.description.abstract	We analyze relational contracting between a principal and a team of agents where only aggregate output is observable. We deduce optimal team incentive contracts under di¤erent set of assumptions, and show that the principal can use team size and team composition as instruments in order to improve incentives. In particular, the principal can strengthen the agents' incentives by composing teams that utilize stochastic dependencies between the agents' outputs. We also show that more agents in the team may under certain conditions increase each team member's effort incentives, in particular if outputs are negatively correlated.	nb_NO
dc.language.iso	eng	nb_NO
dc.publisher	FOR	nb_NO
dc.relation.ispartofseries	Discussion paper;23/16
dc.subject	Relational contracts	nb_NO
dc.subject	team incentive scheme	nb_NO
dc.title	Teams in Relational Contracts	nb_NO
dc.type	Working paper	nb_NO
dc.source.pagenumber	47	nb_NO