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dc.contributor.authorAzad Gholami, Reza
dc.contributor.authorSandal, Leif K.
dc.contributor.authorUbøe, Jan
dc.date.accessioned2019-09-09T10:14:19Z
dc.date.available2019-09-09T10:14:19Z
dc.date.issued2019-09-09
dc.identifier.issn1500-4066
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/2614277
dc.description.abstractWe analyze the problem of time-dependent channel coordination in the face of uncertain demand. The channel, composed of a manufacturer and a retailer, is to address a time-varying and uncertain price-dependent demand. The decision variables of the manufacturer are wholesale and (possibly zero) buy-back prices, and those of the retailer are order quantity and retail price. Moreover, at each period, the retailer is allowed to postpone her retail price until demand uncertainty is resolved. In order to place emphasis on the price-decadent nature of demand, we embed a class of memory effects in demand structure, such that current demand at each period demand is affected by pricing history as well as current price. The ensuing equilibria problems, thus, become highly nested in time. We then propose our memory-based solution algorithm which coordinates the channel with optimal buy-back contracts at each period. We show that, contrary to the conventional belief, too generous buy-back prices may not only be suboptimal to the manufacturer, but also decrease the expected profit for the retailer and thus for the whole channel.nb_NO
dc.language.isoengnb_NO
dc.publisherFORnb_NO
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion paper;10/19
dc.subjectStochastic optimizationnb_NO
dc.subjectbilevel programmingnb_NO
dc.subjectgame theorynb_NO
dc.subjectchannel coordinationnb_NO
dc.subjectbuy-back contractsnb_NO
dc.subjectprice postponementnb_NO
dc.subjectpricing theorynb_NO
dc.subjectcontract theorynb_NO
dc.titleSolution Algorithms for Optimal Buy-Back Contracts in Multi-period Channel Equilibria with Stochastic Demand and Delayed Informationnb_NO
dc.typeWorking papernb_NO
dc.source.pagenumber33nb_NO


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