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dc.contributor.authorSchjelderup, Guttorm
dc.contributor.authorStähler, Frank
dc.date.accessioned2020-08-28T12:15:01Z
dc.date.available2020-08-28T12:15:01Z
dc.date.issued2020-08-28
dc.identifier.issn1500-4066
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11250/2675550
dc.description.abstractThis paper shows that Investor-State Dispute Settlements (ISDS) makes multinational firms more aggressive by increasing cost-reducing investments with the aim to enlarge the potential compensation an ISDS provision may offer. While a larger investment reduces the market distortion, it will also make potential compensations larger. Consequently, potential compensations to a foreign investor do not imply a zero-sum game. ISDS may decrease domestic welfare, in particular if the investment leads to the establishment of an export platform, and we find that even global welfare may decline.en_US
dc.publisherFORen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion paper;9/20
dc.subjectInvestor-State Dispute Settlementen_US
dc.subjectMultinational Enterprisesen_US
dc.subjectForeign Direct Investmenten_US
dc.subjectTTIPen_US
dc.subjectTPPen_US
dc.titleInvestor-State Dispute Settlement and Multinational Firm Behavioren_US
dc.typeWorking paperen_US
dc.source.pagenumber23en_US


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