dc.contributor.author | Schjelderup, Guttorm | |
dc.contributor.author | Stähler, Frank | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2020-08-28T12:15:01Z | |
dc.date.available | 2020-08-28T12:15:01Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2020-08-28 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 1500-4066 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/11250/2675550 | |
dc.description.abstract | This paper shows that Investor-State Dispute Settlements (ISDS) makes multinational firms more aggressive by increasing cost-reducing investments with the aim to enlarge the potential compensation an ISDS provision may offer. While a larger investment reduces the market distortion, it will also make potential compensations larger. Consequently, potential compensations to a foreign investor do not imply a zero-sum game. ISDS may decrease domestic welfare, in particular if the investment leads to the establishment of an export platform, and we find that even global welfare may decline. | en_US |
dc.publisher | FOR | en_US |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | Discussion paper;9/20 | |
dc.subject | Investor-State Dispute Settlement | en_US |
dc.subject | Multinational Enterprises | en_US |
dc.subject | Foreign Direct Investment | en_US |
dc.subject | TTIP | en_US |
dc.subject | TPP | en_US |
dc.title | Investor-State Dispute Settlement and Multinational Firm Behavior | en_US |
dc.type | Working paper | en_US |
dc.source.pagenumber | 23 | en_US |