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dc.contributor.authorPelzl, Paul
dc.contributor.authorValderrama, Maria Teresa
dc.date.accessioned2020-10-16T12:28:11Z
dc.date.available2020-10-16T12:28:11Z
dc.date.issued2020-10-15
dc.identifier.issn1500-4066
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11250/2683366
dc.description.abstractDrawdowns on credit commitments by firms reduce a bank’s capital buffer. Exploiting Austrian credit register data and the 2008-09 financial crisis as exogenous shock to bank health, we provide novel evidence that capital-constrained banks manage this concern by substantially cutting partly or fully unused credit commitments. Controlling for a bank’s capital position, we further find that also larger liquidity problems induce banks to cut such commitments. These results show that banks manage both capital and liquidity risk posed by undrawn credit commitments in periods of financial distress, but thereby reduce liquidity insurance to firms exactly when they need it most.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherFORen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion paper;12/20
dc.subjectCapital Regulationsen_US
dc.subjectCredit Commitmentsen_US
dc.subjectFinancial Crisisen_US
dc.titleCapital Regulations and the Management of Credit Commitments during Crisis Timesen_US
dc.typeWorking paperen_US
dc.source.pagenumber71en_US


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