Compliance with Goodwill Accounting in a Low Enforcement Environment - An empirical study of Swedish listed companies
dc.contributor.author | Tjora, Arne | |
dc.contributor.author | Hagen, Lars Joachim Kvernrød | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2015-09-16T09:37:48Z | |
dc.date.available | 2015-09-16T09:37:48Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2015 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11250/300151 | |
dc.description.abstract | In this paper, we examine the effects of CEO bonus intensity and monitoring of companies on companies mandatory disclosure on acquisitions. We conduct our study in a low enforcement environment by using unique data on Swedish listed companies in the years 2011-2013. In the analysis, we use a self-constructed disclosure index and ordered logistic regressions. We find that only 23 percent of all companies that made acquisitions disclosed all mandatory information. We also find that there is a positive relationship between the amount of monitoring a company is subject to and their disclosure on acquisitions and a negative relationship between CEO bonus intensity and the disclosure on acquisitions. We contribute to the literature by examining goodwill accounting in a low enforcement environment and by examining effects on mandatory disclosure instead of voluntary disclosure. | nb_NO |
dc.language.iso | eng | nb_NO |
dc.subject | financial economics | nb_NO |
dc.subject | business analysis | nb_NO |
dc.title | Compliance with Goodwill Accounting in a Low Enforcement Environment - An empirical study of Swedish listed companies | nb_NO |
dc.type | Master thesis | nb_NO |
dc.description.localcode | nhhmas | nb_NO |
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Master Thesis [4209]