• Early information in auctions with entry 

      Vagstad, Steinar (Working Paper, Working paper, 2004-01)
      Consider an auction in which potential bidders must sink an entry investment before learning their values, but where the auction designer can release information so that the bidders learn their values before entry. Such ...
    • Efficient (re-)scheduling : an auction approach 

      Strandenes, Siri Pettersen; Wolfstetter, Elmar (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2003-10)
      This paper considers one-sided scheduling problems, where a schedule of service is arranged at one location, without regard to other schedules. Typically, such scheduling problems are handled on a first-come-firstserve basis, ...
    • Innovation, competition, and investment timing 

      Koskinen, Yrjö; Mæland, Jøril (Working paper;2013:3, Working paper, 2013)
      In our model multiple innovators compete against each other by submitting investment proposals to an investor. The investor chooses the least expensive proposal and when to invest in it. Innovators have to provide costly ...
    • Should auctioneers supply early information for prospective bidders? 

      Vagstad, Steinar (Working Paper, Working paper, 2001-06)
      Consider an auction in wich potential bidders must sink an entry investment before learning their values (Levin and Smith, 1994). Suppose the auction designer can make the bidders learn their value before entry (as in ...