Blar i NHH Brage på emneord "moral hazard"

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    • Optimal risk sharing 

      Aase, Knut K. (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2003-01)
      Optimal risk sharing is considered from the perspective of the risk sharing model introduced by Karl Borch in the late 50ies. First we introduce, in a modern setting, the main concepts from this theory. These we apply ...

    • Optimal Risk-Sharing and Deductables in Insurance 

      Aase, Knut K. (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2006)
      Risk-sharing in insurance is analyzed, with a view towards explaining the prevalence of deductibles. First we introduce, in a modern setting, the main concepts of the theory of risk-sharing in a group of agents. This theory ...

    • Secrecy Jurisdictions 

      Schjelderup, Guttorm (Discussion paper;12/15, Working paper, 2015-03-10)
      This paper surveys tax haven legislation and links the literature on tax havens to the literature on asymmetric information. I argue that the core aim of tax haven legislation is to create private information (secrecy) ...

    • Sticks and carrots for the alleviation of long-term poverty 

      Schroyen, Fred; Torsvik, Gaute (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2001-12)
      Work requirements can make it easier to screen the poor from the nonpoor. They can also affect future poverty by changing the poors’ incentive to invest in their income capacity. The novelty of our study is the focus ...

    • Taxation of uncertain business profits, private risk markets and optimal allocation of risk 

      Hagen, Kåre Petter; Sannarnes, Jan Gaute (Working paper, Working paper, 2004-12)
      In this paper we explore what happens if the government bears some of the risk through a profit tax when the risk sharing in the venture capital market is incomplete due to non-observability of effort and moral hazard. If ...

    • Taxation of uncertain business profits, private risk markets and optimal allocation of risk 

      Hagen, Kåre Petter; Sannarnes, Jan Gaute (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2005-02)
      In this paper we explore what happens if the government bears some of the risk through a profit tax when the risk sharing in the venture capital market is incomplete due to non-observability of effort and moral hazard. ...