Blar i NHH Brage på emneord "relational contracts"

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    • Asset ownership and relational contracts 

      Bragelien, Iver (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2002)
      In a setting where two managers make relationship- and asset-specific investments, the optimal relational contract specifies the same payments that renegotiations would have led to in a spot mode, plus a fixed transfer and ...

    • Endogenous verifiability in relational contracting 

      Kvaløy, Ola; Olsen, Trond E. (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2004-11)
      We analyze a repeated principal-agent trust game where the principal makes a specific investment by paying the agent up-front, expecting an agreed upon quality level in return. The verifiability of the agent’s action is ...

    • Relational Contracts, Multiple Agents, and Correlated Outputs 

      Kvaløy, Ola; Olsen, Trond Egil (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2019)
      We analyze relational contracts between a principal and a set of risk-neutral agents whose outputs are correlated. When only the agents’ aggregate output can be observed, a team incentive scheme is shown to be optimal, ...

    • Relative performance evaluation, agent hold-up and firm organization 

      Kvaløy, Ola; Olsen, Trond E. (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2007-07)
      We analyze a situation where common noise makes compensation based on relative performance evaluation (RPE) desirable, but where the agents' ability to hold-up values ex post obstruct the implementation of optimal RPE ...

    • The rise of individual performance pay 

      Kvaløy, Ola; Olsen, Trond E. (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2006-07)
      Why does individual performance pay seem to prevail in human-capital-intensive industries where teamwork is so common? We present a model that aims to explain this. In a repeated game model of relational contracting, we ...