• Relational Contracts, Multiple Agents, and Correlated Outputs 

      Kvaløy, Ola; Olsen, Trond Egil (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2019)
      We analyze relational contracts between a principal and a set of risk-neutral agents whose outputs are correlated. When only the agents’ aggregate output can be observed, a team incentive scheme is shown to be optimal, ...
    • You’ve Got Mail: A Randomized Field Experiment on Tax Evasion 

      Bott, Kristina; Cappelen, Alexander Wright; Sørensen, Erik Øiolf; Tungodden, Bertil (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2019)
      We report from a large-scale randomized field experiment conducted on a unique sample of more than 15,000 taxpayers in Norway who were likely to have misreported their foreign income. By randomly manipulating a letter ...