• Credit spreads and incomplete information 

      Lindset, Snorre; Lund, Arne-Christian; Persson, Svein-Arne (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2008-03)
      A new model is presented which produces credit spreads that do not converge to zero for short maturities. Our set-up includes incomplete, i.e., delayed and asymmetric information. When the financial market observes the ...
    • Industrial clusters, asymmetric information and industrial policy 

      Orvedal, Linda (Report, Research report, 2002-06)
      Abstract Recently there has been some attention on the issue of industrial clusters and industrial policy claiming that there are arguments in favour of subsidising special industries in order to stimulate industrial ...
    • Industrial clusters, asymmetric information and policy design 

      Orvedal, Linda (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2002-12)
      Recently there has been some attention on the issue of industrial clusters and industrial policy claiming that there are arguments in favour of subsidising special industries in order to stimulate industrial agglomeration. ...
    • Input price discrimination with heterogenous sub-markets 

      Sand, Jan Yngve (Working paper, Working paper, 2004-12)
      The objective of the paper is to analyse optimal prices for an input monopolist in the presence of asymmetric information about the size of the sub-markets, and when the sub-markets may provide either substitute or ...
    • Insider trading with non-fiduciary market makers 

      Aase, Knut K.; Gjesdal, Frøystein (Discussion paper;8/16, Working paper, 2016-05-23)
      The single auction equilibrium of Kyle's (1985) is studied, in which market makers are not fiduciaries. They have some market power which they utilize to set the price to their advantage, resulting in positive expected ...
    • Insider trading with partially informed traders 

      Aase, Knut K.; Bjuland, Terje; Øksendal, Bernt (Discussion paper;2011:21, Working paper, 2011-11)
      The single auction equilibrium of Kyle's (1985) is studied, in which noise traders may be partially informed, or alternatively they can be manipulated. Unlike Kyle's assumption that the quantity traded by the noise ...
    • Multidimensional screening in a monopolistic insurance market 

      Olivella, Pau; Schroyen, Fred (Discussion Papers;19/2011, Working paper, 2011-11)
      In this paper, we consider a population of individuals who differ in two dimensions: their risk type (expected loss) and their risk aversion. We solve for the profit maximizing menu of contracts that a monopolistic insurer ...
    • Quality incentives pay-off? 

      Strandenes, Siri Pettersen (Report, Research report, 2000-12)
      Intermediaries ascertain vessel quality in shipping markets. Thus, the classification societies set minimum quality requirements for trading vessels. Minimum class requirements do not differentiate between high quality and ...
    • Strategic insider trading equilibrium : a forward integration approach 

      Aase, Knut K.; Bjuland, Terje; Øksendal, Bernt (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2007-11)
      The continuous-time version of Kyle’s (1985) model of asset pricing with asymmetric information is studied, and generalized in various directions, i.e., by allowing time-varying noise trading, and by allowing the orders ...
    • Strategic Insider Trading Equilibrium with a non-fiduciary market maker 

      Aase, Knut K.; Øksendal, Bernt (Discussion paper;2/19, Working paper, 2019-08-28)
      The continuous-time version of Kyle's (1985) model is studied, in which market makers are not fiduciaries. They have some market power which they utilize to set the price to their advantage, resulting in positive expected ...
    • Strategic Insider Trading in Continuous Time: A New Approach 

      Aase, Knut K.; Øksendal, Bernt (Discussion paper;3/19, Working paper, 2019-08-29)
      The continuous-time version of Kyle's (1985) model of asset pricing with asymmetric information is studied, and generalized by allowing time-varying noise trading. From rather simple assumptions we are able to derive the ...