• norsk
    • English
  • norsk 
    • norsk
    • English
  • Logg inn
Vis innførsel 
  •   Hjem
  • Norges Handelshøyskole
  • Department of Economics
  • Discussion papers (SAM)
  • Vis innførsel
  •   Hjem
  • Norges Handelshøyskole
  • Department of Economics
  • Discussion papers (SAM)
  • Vis innførsel
JavaScript is disabled for your browser. Some features of this site may not work without it.

Multidimensional screening in a monopolistic insurance market

Olivella, Pau; Schroyen, Fred
Working paper
Thumbnail
Åpne
19_2011.pdf (598.7Kb)
Permanent lenke
http://hdl.handle.net/11250/163360
Utgivelsesdato
2011-11
Metadata
Vis full innførsel
Samlinger
  • Discussion papers (SAM) [587]
Sammendrag
In this paper, we consider a population of individuals who differ

in two dimensions: their risk type (expected loss) and their risk aversion.

We solve for the profit maximizing menu of contracts that a monopolistic

insurer puts out on the market. First, we find that it is never optimal

to fully separate all the types. Second, if heterogeneity in risk aversion is

sufficiently high, then some high-risk individuals (the risk-tolerant ones) will

obtain lower coverage than some low-risk individuals (the risk-averse ones).

Third, we show that when the average man and woman differ only in risk

aversion, gender discrimination may lead to a Pareto improvement.
Utgiver
Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Economics
Serie
Discussion Papers;19/2011

Kontakt oss | Gi tilbakemelding

Personvernerklæring
DSpace software copyright © 2002-2019  DuraSpace

Levert av  Unit
 

 

Bla i

Hele arkivetDelarkiv og samlingerUtgivelsesdatoForfattereTitlerEmneordDokumenttyperTidsskrifterDenne samlingenUtgivelsesdatoForfattereTitlerEmneordDokumenttyperTidsskrifter

Min side

Logg inn

Statistikk

Besøksstatistikk

Kontakt oss | Gi tilbakemelding

Personvernerklæring
DSpace software copyright © 2002-2019  DuraSpace

Levert av  Unit