• Foreclosure in contests 

      Clark, Derek J.; Foros, Øystein; Sand, Jan Yngve (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2008-12)
      We consider a contest in which one firm is a favourite as it initially has a cost advantage over rivals. Instead of taking the set of rivals as given, we consider the possibility that the favourite transfers the source ...
    • Licensing technology and foreclosure 

      Clark, Derek J.; Foros, Øystein; Sand, Jan Yngve (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2007-10)
      We consider an industry where one firm with a superior technology competes for market shares with several rivals. The owner of the superior technology (the dominant firm) can license or transfer the source of its ...
    • Licensing technology and foreclosure 

      Clark, Derek J.; Foros, Øystein; Sand, Jan Yngve (Working paper, Working paper, 2007-12)
      We consider an industry where one firm with a superior technology competes for market shares with several rivals. The owner of the superior technology (the dominant firm) can license or transfer the source of its dominance ...
    • Risk taking in selection contests 

      Hvide, Hans K.; Kristiansen, Eirik Gaard (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2000-11)
      We study selection contests in which the strategic variable is degree of risk rather than amount of effort. The selection efficiency of such contests is examined. We show that the selection efficiency of a contest may be ...
    • The power of money : wealth effects in contests 

      Schroyen, Fred; Treich, Nicolas (Discussion Papers;13/2013, Working paper, 2013-06)
      Two wealth effects typically arise in any contest: i) wealth decreases the marginal cost of effort, but also ii) decreases the marginal benefit of winning the contest. In this paper, we introduce three types of strategic ...