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Licensing technology and foreclosure

Clark, Derek J.; Foros, Øystein; Sand, Jan Yngve
Working paper
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URI
http://hdl.handle.net/11250/163100
Date
2007-10
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  • Discussion papers (SAM) [578]
Abstract
We consider an industry where one firm with a superior technology competes

for market shares with several rivals. The owner of the superior technology

(the dominant firm) can license or transfer the source of its dominance

to a subset of rivals. Allowing the non-license takers to remain active in the

market is a drain on the profit of the insiders, and we demonstrate that the

dominant firm will only make a transfer of the superior technology if it can be

used to foreclose some rival firms. Foreclosure of a subset of firms may thus

be the outcome even without restrictions on the licensing schemes. Moreover,

we show that when licensing is profitable, the dominant firm will prefer a

complete transfer even if a partial transfer can be made.
Publisher
Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. Department of Economics
Series
Discussion paper
2007:29

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