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dc.contributor.authorClark, Derek J.
dc.contributor.authorForos, Øystein
dc.contributor.authorSand, Jan Yngve
dc.date.accessioned2008-05-15T07:45:45Z
dc.date.available2008-05-15T07:45:45Z
dc.date.issued2007-10
dc.identifier.issn0804-6824
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/163100
dc.description.abstractWe consider an industry where one firm with a superior technology competes for market shares with several rivals. The owner of the superior technology (the dominant firm) can license or transfer the source of its dominance to a subset of rivals. Allowing the non-license takers to remain active in the market is a drain on the profit of the insiders, and we demonstrate that the dominant firm will only make a transfer of the superior technology if it can be used to foreclose some rival firms. Foreclosure of a subset of firms may thus be the outcome even without restrictions on the licensing schemes. Moreover, we show that when licensing is profitable, the dominant firm will prefer a complete transfer even if a partial transfer can be made.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisherNorwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. Department of Economicsen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion paperen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2007:29en
dc.subjectlicensingen
dc.subjectforeclosureen
dc.subjectcontesten
dc.titleLicensing technology and foreclosureen
dc.typeWorking paperen
dc.subject.nsiVDP::Samfunnsvitenskap: 200::Økonomi: 210::Samfunnsøkonomi: 212en


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