• A behavioral explanation of the relative performance evaluation puzzle 

      Fershtman, Chaim; Hvide, Hans K.; Weiss, Yoram (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2002-11)
      We study the effects of competitive preferences, where Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) compare their wage to the wage of other CEOs within the same industry, and derive additional utility from being ahead of them. We show ...
    • Education and the allocation of talent 

      Hvide, Hans K. (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2000-12)
      This paper considers a two-sector education model with two novel features. First, contracts have an independent role in sorting workers into different sectors of the economy. Second, education improves workers’ awareness ...
    • Firm size and the quality of entrepreneurs 

      Hvide, Hans K. (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2004-06)
      A theory is proposed where the pay policy and size of established firms are determined together with individual workers' entrepreneurship decision. The main results are twofold. First, taking the firm size as given, larger ...
    • Five essays on bounded rationality and game theory 

      Hvide, Hans K. (Doctoral thesis, 1997)
    • Free-entry equilibrium in a market for certifiers 

      Hvide, Hans K.; Heifetz, Aviad (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2001-05)
      The role of certifiers is to test products for quality, and to communicate the test results to the market. We construct a free-entry model of certification, where each certifier chooses a test standard and a price for ...
    • Liquidity constraints and entrepreneurial performance 

      Hvide, Hans K.; Møen, Jarle (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2007-09)
      If entrepreneurs are liquidity constrained and cannot borrow to operate on an efficient scale, those with more personal wealth should do better than those with less wealth. We investigate this hypothesis using a unique ...
    • Management of knowledge workers 

      Hvide, Hans K.; Kristiansen, Eirik Gaard (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2006-05)
      We study how complementarities and intellectual property rights affect the management of knowledge workers. The main results relay when a firm will wish to sue workers that leave with innovative ideas, and the effects ...
    • Management of Knowledge Workers 

      Hvide, Hans K.; Kristiansen, Eirik Gaard (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2006-06)
      We study how complementarities and intellectual property rights affect the management of knowledge workers. The main results relay when a firm will wish to sue workers that leave with innovative ideas, and the effects of ...
    • Optimal contracts under imperfect enforcement revisited 

      Hvide, Hans K. (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2005-08)
      We consider a financing game with costly enforcement based on Townsend (1979), but where monitoring is non-contractible and allowed to be stochastic. Debt is the optimal contract. Moreover, the debt contract induces creditor ...
    • Pragmatic beliefs and overconfidence 

      Hvide, Hans K. (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2000-06)
      Several studies indicate that humans are overconfident about their own (relative) abilities. We propose a notion of pragmatic beliefs, and show through an example that this concept can shed light on why overconfidence ...
    • Risk taking in selection contests 

      Hvide, Hans K.; Kristiansen, Eirik Gaard (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2000-11)
      We study selection contests in which the strategic variable is degree of risk rather than amount of effort. The selection efficiency of such contests is examined. We show that the selection efficiency of a contest may be ...
    • Segmentation and pricing behavior in a market for certification 

      Hvide, Hans K. (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2002-11)
      The paper offers a simple theory of pricing behavior in certification markets. The basis for the theory is that certifiers offer differentiated tests; for an object of given quality it may be more difficult to pass the ...
    • Some comments on free-riding in leontief partnerships 

      Hvide, Hans K. (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2001)
      Holmström (1982) showed that free-riding is inevitable in partnerships where inputs are substitutes. Legros & Matthews (1993) and Vislie (1994) showed that when inputs are strict complements (Leontief technology), free-riding ...
    • Status concerns and the organization of work 

      Fershtman, Chaim; Hvide, Hans K.; Weiss, Yoram (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2001-01)
      We study the effects of local status, where workers compare their wage to the wage of other workers within the same firm. We assume a competitive labor market with unobservable effort, where firms condition wages on output ...
    • Strategic defaults and priority violations under costly state verification 

      Hvide, Hans K.; Leite, Tore (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2002-06)
      We reformulate the classic CSV model of financial contracting from Townsend (1979) and Gale & Hellwig (1985) to tackle criticisms raised against it, such as lack of subgame-perfectness at the repayment stage and its inability ...
    • A theory of certification with an application to the market for auditing services 

      Hvide, Hans K. (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2004-08)
      The paper develops a theory which attempts to understand segmentation and fee-setting in certification markets. The basis for the theory is that certifiers offer differentiated tests; for a given object it may be more ...
    • Tournament rewards and risk taking 

      Hvide, Hans K. (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2000-06)
      In a tournament, a principal sets a prize, and several agents then compete to attain the highest observed output, and win the prize. This paper departs from the existing literature on tournaments by assuming that agents ...
    • Wage dynamics and career concerns in anarchistic firms 

      Hvide, Hans K.; Kaplan, Todd (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2001-04)
      We consider firms where a worker’s effort level is contractible, but individual output is not. We attempt to determine equilibrium degree of worker discretion in choice of task (specialization) when workers have private ...