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Management of knowledge workers

Hvide, Hans K.; Kristiansen, Eirik Gaard
Working paper
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URI
http://hdl.handle.net/11250/162710
Date
2006-05
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  • Discussion papers (SAM) [579]
Abstract
We study how complementarities and intellectual property rights affect the management

of knowledge workers. The main results relay when a firm will wish to

sue workers that leave with innovative ideas, and the effects of complementary assets

on wages and on worker initiative. We argue that firms strongly protected

by property rights may not sue leaving workers in order to motivate effort, while

firms weakly protected by complementary assets must sue in order to obtain positive

profits. Firms with more complementary assets pay higher wages (and have

lower turnover), but such higher pay has a detrimental effect on worker initiative.

Our analysis suggests that strengthened property rights protection reduces turnover costs but weakens worker initiative.
Publisher
Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. Department of Economics
Series
Discussion paper
2006:20

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