• Anomalies of Instant Runoff Voting 

      Stensholt, Eivind (Discussion paper;6/20, Working paper, 2020-06-23)
      Struggles over the single-seat preferential election method IRV (Instant Runoff Voting) go on in public arenas and scientific journals, with focus on two “anomalies”. “Monotonicity failures” are preference distributions ...
    • Condorcet methods - when, why and how? 

      Stensholt, Eivind (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2008)
      Geometric representations of 3-candidate profiles are used to investigate properties of preferential election methods. The representation visualizes both the possibility to win by agenda manipulation, i.e. introducing a ...
    • Gibbard-Satterthwaite and an Arrovian Connection 

      Stensholt, Eivind (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2008-06)
      A very close link of G-S, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem to Arrow’s "impossibility" theorem is shown. G-S is derived as a corollary: from a strategy-proof singleseat election method F is constructed an election method ...
    • MMP-elections and the assembly size 

      Stensholt, Eivind (Discussion paper;15/19, Working paper, 2019-10-30)
      MMP (Mixed Member Proportional) elections for legislatures have ballots with one vote in a local single seat tally and one vote for a party list in a multi-seat tally. In Germany, the multi-seat tally occasionally violated ...
    • Preferansevalg: Opptellingsregler og velgeradferd 

      Stensholt, Eivind (Discussion paper;08/2013, Working paper, 2013-08)
      Ved preferansevalg gir velgeren en mer eller mindre fullstendig rangering av alternativene eller kandidatene. Hovedtemaene på disse sidene presenteres i innledningskapitlet: tre store familier av preferansevalg, nemlig ...
    • Single transferable votes with tax-cuts 

      Stensholt, Eivind (Discussion Paper, Working paper, 2000)
      Some tally methods for preferential elections are discussed from the following point of view: how well do they respect a wish from the voter that subsidiary votes in the ballot cannot hurt the chances of the ballot’s ...
    • Voces populi and the art of listening 

      Stensholt, Eivind (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2008-06)
      The strategy most damaging to many preferential election methods is to give insincerely low rank to the main opponent of one’s favorite candidate. Theorem 1 determines the 3-candidate Condorcet method that minimizes the ...
    • What Happened in Burlington? 

      Stensholt, Eivind (Discussion paper;26/15, Working paper, 2015-10-07)
      Three visualization techniques illustrate the distribution of electoral preferences over a candidate triple. Two of them, introduced here, concern an IRV tally. The conditions that may allow the “pushover strategy” and ...
    • What is wrong with IRV? 

      Stensholt, Eivind (Discussion paper;13/18, Working paper, 2018-10-22)
      Struggles over the single-seat preferential election method IRV, Instant Runoff Voting, (a.k.a. AV, Alternative Vote or RCV, Ranked-Choice Voting) go on in many arenas: legislatures, courts, websites, and scholarly ...