Now showing items 1-15 of 15

• #### Anomalies of Instant Runoff Voting ﻿

(Discussion paper;6/20, Working paper, 2020-06-23)
Struggles over the single-seat preferential election method IRV (Instant Runoff Voting) go on in public arenas and scientific journals, with focus on two “anomalies”. “Monotonicity failures” are preference distributions ...
• #### Condorcet methods - when, why and how? ﻿

(Discussion paper, Working paper, 2008)
Geometric representations of 3-candidate profiles are used to investigate properties of preferential election methods. The representation visualizes both the possibility to win by agenda manipulation, i.e. introducing a ...
• #### Faithful accounting in MMP-elections ﻿

(Discussion paper;7/21, Working paper, 2021-07-14)
In MMP-elections for legislatures, political parties compete for a voter’s support in two ways: for a first vote to the party’s candidate in a single-seat constituency and for a second vote to the party’s list of candidates. ...
• #### Gibbard-Satterthwaite and an Arrovian Connection ﻿

(Discussion paper, Working paper, 2008-06)
A very close link of G-S, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem to Arrow’s "impossibility" theorem is shown. G-S is derived as a corollary: from a strategy-proof singleseat election method F is constructed an election method ...
• #### Mixed Member Proportional with faithful accounting ﻿

(Discussion paper;5/21, Working paper, 2021-03-15)
With present (2021) tally rules, the number of seats in the Bundestag is highly volatile. In 2017 it got 709 seats, 111 of them extra-ordinary. The rules may double the influence of a voter who splits the ballot, contrary ...
• #### Mixed Member Proportional; equal influence and assembly size ﻿

(Discussion paper;10/20, Working paper, 2020-08-31)
With the present (2020) tally rules, the number of seats in the Bundestag is highly volatile. In 2017 it got 709 seats, 111 of them extra-ordinary. The tally rules may double the influence of a voter who splits the vote; ...
• #### MMP-elections and the assembly size ﻿

(Discussion paper;15/19, Working paper, 2019-10-30)
MMP (Mixed Member Proportional) elections for legislatures have ballots with one vote in a local single seat tally and one vote for a party list in a multi-seat tally. In Germany, the multi-seat tally occasionally violated ...
• #### MMP-Elections: Equal Influence and Controlled Assembly Size ﻿

(Discussion paper;6/23, Working paper, 2023-05-31)
In an MMP election (Mixed Member Proportional) of a legislature, a QP-ballot supports party Q in a single-seat constituency and a list of candidates from P. With ꙍ(j) constituency seats won and list support in z(Pj) ballots, ...
• #### Predetermined Assembly Size and Equal Influence in MMP-Elections ﻿

(Discussion paper;11/22, Working paper, 2022-06-21)
In MMP-elections (Mixed Member Proportional representation), a QP-ballot contains a first-vote for party Q’s candidate in a single-seat constituency and a second-vote for a list of candidates from party P in one common ...
• #### Preferansevalg: Opptellingsregler og velgeradferd ﻿

(Discussion paper;08/2013, Working paper, 2013-08)
Ved preferansevalg gir velgeren en mer eller mindre fullstendig rangering av alternativene eller kandidatene. Hovedtemaene på disse sidene presenteres i innledningskapitlet: tre store familier av preferansevalg, nemlig ...
• #### Single transferable votes with tax-cuts ﻿

(Discussion Paper, Working paper, 2000)
Some tally methods for preferential elections are discussed from the following point of view: how well do they respect a wish from the voter that subsidiary votes in the ballot cannot hurt the chances of the ballot’s ...
• #### The Structure of MMP-Elections ﻿

(Discussion paper;9/21, Working paper, 2021-12-15)
In MMP-elections (Mixed Member Proportional representation), a QP-ballot contains a first-vote for party Q’s candidate in a single-seat constituency and a second-vote for a list of candidates from party P in one common ...
• #### Voces populi and the art of listening ﻿

(Discussion paper, Working paper, 2008-06)
The strategy most damaging to many preferential election methods is to give insincerely low rank to the main opponent of one’s favorite candidate. Theorem 1 determines the 3-candidate Condorcet method that minimizes the ...
• #### What Happened in Burlington? ﻿

(Discussion paper;26/15, Working paper, 2015-10-07)
Three visualization techniques illustrate the distribution of electoral preferences over a candidate triple. Two of them, introduced here, concern an IRV tally. The conditions that may allow the “pushover strategy” and ...
• #### What is wrong with IRV? ﻿

(Discussion paper;13/18, Working paper, 2018-10-22)
Struggles over the single-seat preferential election method IRV, Instant Runoff Voting, (a.k.a. AV, Alternative Vote or RCV, Ranked-Choice Voting) go on in many arenas: legislatures, courts, websites, and scholarly ...