Single transferable votes with tax-cuts
Working paper
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http://hdl.handle.net/11250/163845Utgivelsesdato
2000Metadata
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Sammendrag
Some tally methods for preferential elections are discussed from the following point of view: how well do they respect a wish from the voter that subsidiary votes in the ballot cannot hurt the chances of the ballot’s top-ranked candidate? The tally method of Single Transferable Votes, STV, is constructed to obey this principle without exception, but other defects show up, in particular non-monotonicity, premature eliminations, and free rides. Various modifications of the STV are suggested to reduce the election method’s weaknesses without losing too much of its strengths.
Utgiver
Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. Department of Finance and Management ScienceSerie
Discussion Paper2000:16