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dc.contributor.authorMatsen, Egil
dc.contributor.authorThøgersen, Øystein
dc.date.accessioned2008-10-21T12:57:38Z
dc.date.available2008-10-21T12:57:38Z
dc.date.issued2008-06
dc.identifier.isbn978-82-491-0577-9 (elektronisk versjon)
dc.identifier.isbn978-82-491-0576-2 (trykt versjon)
dc.identifier.issn0803-4036
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/165301
dc.description.abstractWe suggest a probabilistic voting model where voters’ preferences for alternative public goods display habit formation. Current policies determine habit levels and in turn the future preferences of the voters. This allows the incumbent to act strategically in order to influence the probability of re-election. Comparing to a benchmark case of a certain re-election, we demonstrate that the incumbent’s optimal policy features both a more polarized allocation between the alternative public goods and a debt bias.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisherSNFen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesReporten
dc.relation.ispartofseries2008:11en
dc.titleHabit formation, strategic extremism and debt policyen
dc.typeResearch reporten
dc.subject.nsiVDP::Samfunnsvitenskap: 200::Økonomi: 210::Samfunnsøkonomi: 212en


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