An efficient anticorruption sanctions regime. The case of the World Bank
Journal article, Peer reviewed
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Original versionThe Chicago Journal of International Law 2016, 16(2):523-552
With its sanctions regime, the World Bank has sent a clear message to client governments and suppliers that it will not tolerate corruption. However, as this Article argues, with its present design, the sanctions regime at the same time runs counter to the World Bank’s own development agenda. Thus, the regime will have limited effect in protecting funds for development, reducing corruption risks, promoting the integrity and functionality of markets, and strengthening domestic law enforcement institutions. A key problem is that efforts to strengthen law enforcement at the national level are too limited. The sanctions primarily target private suppliers, while governments are not held responsible when fraud or corruption occurs. This reflects the World Bank’s challenging mandate to offer financial support to developing country governments while also trying to secure efficient use of the funds after they have been transferred. In considering alternative designs for its anti-corruption strategy, the Bank should collaborate with other international development banks to demand integrity mechanisms that rely upon and strengthen domestic law enforcement institutions and competition authorities in client countries.