| dc.description.abstract | In 2006, Norway introduced a boardroom quota requiring a minimum of 40 percent of each
gender in the boardroom of public limited liability companies (ASA). Companies were given
until January 2008 to comply. This paper investigates whether Norway’s boardroom quota has
had positive spillover effects on the corporate executive committee (C-suite). Through
econometric modeling, I will test if there was a significant increase in female representation
and reduced gender wage gap among chief executive officers (CEOs) and executive vice
presidents (EVPs) post-quota. My empirical analyses on CEOs are conducted based on data
from Statistics Norway from 2004 to 2015. For the EVPs, a case study examining the ten
largest ASA companies in Norway is conducted.
My empirical results indicate limited evidence of higher female representation in the
C-suite post-quota (2008-2015). While the female representation has increased in CEO and
EVP positions post-quota, my analyses fail to prove that this increase is due to the quota. When
investigating a shorter time period (2008-2011) there is some evidence of higher female
representation due to the quota. However, this finding only applies to CEOs in large firms
where the workforce is dominated by women.
Furthermore, I find that female CEOs and EVPs earn on average 28.9% and 16.2% less
than their male counterparts when comparing the fixed salary, respectively. My analyses also
find a significant gender gap in other types of remunerations. When investigating the effects
of the quota, my findings suggest no reduced gender wage gap among CEOs and EVPs.
Altogether, this study suggests that the boardroom quota has had no substantial
spillover effects on the female representation and gender wage gap in CEO and EVP positions. | nb_NO |
