Some implications of a mandatory gender quota for firms implementing at different points in time

Abstract

This master’s thesis examines some of the implications of the Norwegian gender quota for firms implementing it at different points in time. It is found that firms lose between 14% and 22% of their general board experience dependent on when they implement the quota. Firms implementing earlier lose on average less experience than firms adapting later. However, the earliest implementers nominate women, and the later adapters men with more previous board experience in the same sector of the economy, in the mandatory transition period. The later a firm adapts is also found to be casually related to the probability of the firm changing its board size in order to meet the quota. Further, firms implementing later has higher board turnover among both female and male members in the years prior to and after the quota became mandatory. The compensation offered the CEO increases sharply for the earliest adapters when they implement the quota. This could be consistent with either a stronger governance structure and better incentives, or weaker governance where the CEO utilizes a relatively enhanced bargaining position.