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dc.contributor.authorDahlberg, Joen
dc.contributor.authorEngevall, Stefan
dc.contributor.authorGöthe-Lundgren, Maud
dc.contributor.authorJørnsten, Kurt
dc.contributor.authorRönnqvist, Mikael
dc.identifier.citationCentral European Journal of Operations Research. 2018, .nb_NO
dc.description.abstractIn this paper, we focus on how cost allocation can be used as a means to create incentives for collaboration among companies, with the aim of reducing the total transportation cost. The collaboration is assumed to be preceded by a simultaneous invitation of the companies to collaborate. We make use of concepts from cooperative game theory, including the Shapley value, the Nucleolus and the EPM, and develop specific cost allocation mechanisms aiming to achieve large collaborations among many companies. The cost allocation mechanisms are tested on a case study that involves transportation planning activities. Although the case study is from a specific transportation sector, the findings in this paper can be adapted to collaborations in other types of transportation planning activities. Two of the cost allocation mechanisms ensure that any sequence of companies joining the collaboration represents a complete monotonic path, that is, any sequence of collaborating companies is such that the sequences of allocated costs are non-increasing for all companies.nb_NO
dc.rightsNavngivelse 4.0 Internasjonal*
dc.subjectTransportation planningnb_NO
dc.subjectMonotonic pathnb_NO
dc.subjectCost allocationnb_NO
dc.subjectCooperative game theorynb_NO
dc.titleIncitements for transportation collaboration by cost allocationnb_NO
dc.title.alternativeIncitements for transportation collaboration by cost allocationnb_NO
dc.typeJournal articlenb_NO
dc.typePeer reviewednb_NO
dc.subject.nsiVDP::Technology: 500::Information and communication technology: 550::Other information technology: 559nb_NO
dc.subject.nsiVDP::Social science: 200::Economics: 210::Economics: 212nb_NO
dc.source.journalCentral European Journal of Operations Researchnb_NO
cristin.unitnameInstitutt for foretaksøkonomi

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Navngivelse 4.0 Internasjonal
Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as Navngivelse 4.0 Internasjonal